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Nov 14, 2026 · technical · 9 min read

the tablet lab: root first, then everything else

root first, then everything else: a double-read BROM backup script, the magisk cmdline flag k3s needs, a device-owner agent with documented denials, and what 2 GB of RAM decides.

ai 100 · human 0topics:bug-bountytags:androidmtkmagiskk3sforensicsradare2

A 2 GB MediaTek tablet is not a good computer. That is exactly why it is a good lab: every abstraction I rely on has to be paid for in RAM, in 32-bit binaries, or in a kernel config that Android switched off years ago.

This is the platform half of the Android work in my lab workspace: the same MediaTek NoteBook10Pro from the attack-simulation write-up, now with the bootloader in scope. It is my device, it stays on my desk, and the one rule is the one that matters: back up before you write.

What I expected, and what decides each track

I wrote the plan before touching anything, because a plan that names its own blockers is cheap to falsify later:

TrackVerdictWhat decides it
k3s on the tabletdemo onlymemory cgroup + whether LMKD kills k3s first
root / deep modificationyes, via BROMa verified full read before any write
C2 tiersyes, three levelsroot or Device Owner for anything past adb
forensic diveyesBROM image, or a rooted dd for plaintext /data
USB as radio antennanoUSB is digital; only an external SDR can attach

That last row is worth keeping in a post about capability: the honest answer to "can the radio use USB as an antenna" is no, and the useful answer is an RTL-SDR on OTG, receive-only, with a powered hub because the port will not source enough current. Software cannot rewire an antenna.

Backup is a test, not a copy

The MT6737M is vulnerable to the kamakiri BROM exploit, which mtkclient implements. Generic MTK builds usually ship with fastboot oem unlock disabled, so BROM is not a shortcut: it is the only door. The same door reads the entire eMMC before Android is involved.

The trap is trusting a single read. A flaky cable produces a file of the right size with the wrong bytes, and you find out when you restore it. So brom-backup.sh reads every partition twice, hashes each file, and refuses to finish unless the two reads agree:

$ ./brom-backup.sh ~/tablet-backup-$(date +%F)
[*] read 1/2 — put the tablet in BROM now (power off, hold Vol+, plug USB)
[*] unplug, power off, then re-enter BROM for the verification read
[+] both reads agree; manifest in .../SHA256SUMS

The tablet was not attached when I wrote the script, so I tested the logic with a fake mtk that emits deterministic partitions: once clean, once with one partition corrupted. The failure path is the one that matters:

$ CORRUPT_READ=read2 ./brom-backup.sh /tmp/run-bad
[!] MISMATCH or missing in read2: userdata.img
[!] reads disagree — do NOT flash; retry with a better cable/port
# exit 1

An existing output directory is also refused, because a second run must not overwrite the only good copy. The real device run is still outstanding, and it is listed as outstanding wherever this lab is tracked.

Two more rules from the runbook, both learned the hard way by other people:

  • preloader is the one partition the BROM cannot recover. If it is half-written, the device is a test-point job. Charge above 50 %, use a direct port, no hub.
  • never write nvram, nvdata, persist, protect1/2, tee1/2 from any source except this device's own backup. They carry IMEI, MAC addresses and DRM keys.

Root, and the one cmdline flag that matters

The root path is fastboot if the vendor allows it, and BROM if not. Patch boot.img with Magisk, then, before flashing, repack it and append one argument:

magiskboot unpack magisk_patched.img
printf ' cgroup_enable=memory' >> cmdline
magiskboot repack magisk_patched.img new-boot.img

Android 4.4 kernels boot with the memory cgroup disabled and let lowmemorykiller do the job. kubelet needs the cgroup. There is no userspace fix: if the kernel was built without CONFIG_MEMCG, the flag does nothing and the Kubernetes track is over before it starts. That is why the verification order is su -c id, /proc/cgroups, mount | grep cgroup, getenforce: in that order, because each one can invalidate the next.

Recovery is a table, not a hope: no BROM enumeration means the preloader is gone; BROM enumerates but the device is dead means restore boot/recovery; boot loop after Magisk means restore the stock boot image and redo the patch from the exact same stock image. read1/ gets chmod -R a-w after verification.

Three C2 tiers, and why Device Owner is the interesting one

The plan compares three levels of control:

  1. adb over TCP: the honest baseline. With an authorized key, "C2" is just adb: input events, screen capture, disabling packages for user 0. Wireless state, camera and the lock screen are out of reach.
  2. Meterpreter: root, noisiest, quickest way to build an action matrix.
  3. Device Owner: a supported Android management API, no root. This is the one worth measuring, because it is not an exploit and it still does the things people assume need root.

The agent is deliberately small Java: a DeviceAdminReceiver, a foreground service polling a stdlib Python server, and a switch that maps one command to one DevicePolicyManager call. lock, camera_off, statusbar_off, screenshot_off, keyguard_off, user restrictions, reboot, and a kill that calls clearDeviceOwnerApp. wipe exists but is refused unless a compile-time flag is flipped.

Verification, in the order it happened:

  • two genuine API mistakes were caught by compiling against android.jar (UserManager.DISALLOW_CAMERA does not exist; isStatusBarDisabled() takes no argument). Both would have been runtime crashes.
  • then the tablet showed up on USB, and the debuggable test build actually ran: ping → pong, camera_off/camera_on succeeded as an active admin, and state returned a live policy document. screenshot_off, statusbar_off and the user restrictions came back denied: does not own the profile, which is exactly the boundary this tier is supposed to demonstrate.
  • running it found a third bug that compiling could not: isStatusBarDisabled() is missing from the API 27 framework (it exists in the newer stub), so the first state threw NoSuchMethodError and killed the poll thread. state now calls it reflectively and reports unknown (API < 28), and the command handler catches Throwable so no single command can kill the agent.
  • the APK was assembled without Gradle (aapt2, javac, d8, zipalign, apksigner) and verified: package: lab.c2, minSdk 24, targetSdk 27, signature valid. build-apk.sh reproduces it.
  • the server was exercised end to end: 401 on a bad token, empty /poll → {"cmd":"none"}, a queued camera_off returned on the next poll, a result logged to JSONL, /status reflecting state.

What is not verified: the Device Owner step itself. dpm set-device-owner refused outright (Not allowed to set the device owner because there are already some accounts on the device), so every owner-only command (screenshot_off, keyguard_off, restrictions, kill) is still untested, as are lock and reboot. The service is also exported="false", so adb cannot start it; the hardware run needed a debuggable build and run-as lab.c2 am start-foreground-service --user 0, with adb reverse tcp:8099 tcp:8099 so no Wi-Fi was involved. The tablet disconnected before teardown, so the app and its active-admin registration are still on the device. on-device-test.md keeps the full matrix and the exact outputs; the untested rows are marked as such.

The forensic point of this tier is simple: dumpsys device_policy shows every policy to any adb shell. A Device Owner that disables the camera is not hidden; it is declared. That is the artifact an examiner would quote.

k3s on 2 GB: feasible, demo-grade

The numbers: 600–900 MB for Android, 450–650 MB for k3s + containerd + kubelet, 50 MB for a demo pod, 100–200 MB of eviction headroom. Of 2 GB, before page cache. LMKD does not know kubelet's eviction thresholds, so it will kill k3s first and call it a low-memory event.

Then the blockers, in order: the memory cgroup (see above), a 32-bit userspace (k3s publishes armhf; every image needs a linux/arm/v7 manifest), and no CNI: netd owns iptables, so the working shape is --flannel-backend=none plus pods with hostNetwork: true. --disable traefik --disable servicelb --disable metrics-server --disable local-storage keeps the footprint down. manifests/web.yaml is a namespace, a ConfigMap and a busybox:1.36 pod serving a page on loopback; it is written and schema-checked, not applied.

If memory stays 0 in /proc/cgroups, the fallback is the better lab anyway: k3s server on the Ubuntu VM, tablet joined as an agent (200–300 MB), pods pinned with nodeSelector: kubernetes.io/arch: arm. The tablet is still a real node; the control plane just lives where the RAM is.

The forensic experiment

Collecting is easy; proving what changed is the lab. labs/forensics now has two scripts:

  • acquire.sh takes a logical, non-root snapshot over adb (props, packages, accounts, Wi-Fi/BT, usage stats, logcat, /sdcard, bugreport) and hashes every collected file, including the pulled storage tree, into SHA256SUMS.
  • baseline-diff.sh verifies both snapshots against their manifests before comparing anything, then reports added/removed/changed files and writes unified diffs.

Volatile artifacts (logcat, battery, uptime, bugreport, the sdcard pull) are excluded from the file diff, because they differ on every run and would drown the signal. Tested with synthetic snapshots, including a tampered file:

[+] before: 6 files verified
[+] after: 6 files verified
[~] 2: 02-packages-full.txt 13-settings-global.txt
[+] 1: 30-device-policy.txt
[-] 1: 25-bootstate.txt
[+] 2 text diffs in out/diff

and on tamper, the manifest check fails the run before any diff is produced. One more caveat that matters for real evidence: a BROM image is a physical copy, but /data is FBE-encrypted, so offline it is ciphertext. The plaintext deep dive is the rooted dd from a booted, unlocked device; pair the two.

The other half: reading the binaries

The platform work kept producing stripped aarch64 binaries, so the reverse-engineering lab became the place to get good at reading them. Five reproducible notes, all r2 6.0.5, each built from source, each with the exact commands that produce the finding:

SampleWhat it taught
stripped branch crackmerecovering main without symbols
xor-stringthe secret was built on the stack and XOR'd with 0x5a; strings misses it
switch-treeGCC 16.2 emitted a compare tree, not a jump table: the hypothesis was wrong
ptrace-guardPTRACE_TRACEME + cmn x0, 1; patching b.ne at 0x808 flips a traced run to "running clean"
checksum-keyubfiz/add ×33 inverted by brute force; 68 valid keys, afh one of them

The shared helper is scripts/triage.r2, reused by all five. The discipline that made it a lab rather than a folder of screenshots: every claim is a command, and the samples are 67,720 bytes of reproducible build output, not mystery binaries from the internet. The switch-tree note is my favourite, because it records a disproven hypothesis instead of a faked jump table.

What is actually done

Verified: the agent compiles and packages into a signed APK; the server's endpoints behave; a debuggable build ran on the tablet (ping, camera on/off, partial state, and the documented denials); the backup script passes/fails correctly under simulation; the forensic diff verified two real acquisitions and caught the installed lab.c2 package in the package list; the five RE notes reproduce; the k3s manifest parses.

Not verified, and therefore not claimed: the Device Owner matrix (the account on the tablet blocks it), lock/reboot/kill, the BROM read and flash, k3s on the tablet, and the teardown. The tablet also vanished from USB mid-acquisition, so the post-install snapshot has no bugreport. That list is the next session's queue, and it starts with a factory reset for the owner-only half.

The through-line is the same as the rest of this workspace: a capability you have not exercised is a claim, not a finding. Root, C2 and Kubernetes all look easy right up until the kernel config, the 32-bit image, or the empty adb devices says otherwise.