Case study: CSP policy & parsing analysis
Engagement: authorized CSP-bypass program on a large commerce platform. Role: independent security researcher. Deliverable: a scope memo and a measured policy-parsing report.
The problem
The program published a Content-Security-Policy in a PDF and said only bypasses to that policy count. The live site sent a different header. Before spending any time on bypasses, the client needed an answer to a deceptively simple question: which policy is actually enforced, and what does it allow?
Getting this wrong wastes the whole engagement — you either chase a bypass the program will reject, or dismiss a real one because the PDF was stale.
Approach
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Quote the printed policy verbatim and treat it as the scope boundary.
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Capture the live header on the in-scope hosts, unmodified.
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Reproduce the exact header locally and test it against a page with known controls, so each observation has a baseline:
Observation What it isolates inline <script>without a noncebaseline: inline blocked nonce'd script nonce works eval()/new Function()whether 'unsafe-eval'is realstring onerror=attributescript-src-attrbehaviour<object data=…>object-srccomma-separated header + discriminator page whether a comma starts a second policy or extends the first -
Test the comma question directly with a discriminator page (
default-src 'self', img-src 'none'): if the image is blocked, the comma separates two independently enforced policies.
What was delivered
- A one-page scope memo: "only bypasses to the printed policy are valid", with the exact directive string.
- A measurement table comparing printed policy, live header, and controls.
- A decision framework: what counts as a bypass, what is just a weak header, and
the one genuine divergence (
'unsafe-eval'present live, absent from the PDF) flagged as a question for the program rather than assumed exploitable. - A clear "do not report" list (comma-separated header ≠ bypass; missing header ≠ finding).
Result
The comma tail was not absorbed into object-src — it started a second,
independently enforced policy. Enforcement is the intersection, so the weaker
clause loosens nothing. The only real weakening was 'unsafe-eval', and only
against the live header, not the PDF.
Net result: no CSP bypass found, plus a defensible scope position that saved the engagement from chasing invalid targets.
Why this matters to a client
- You learn quickly whether your CSP is actually protecting anything.
- You get a written, evidence-backed boundary for what a bounty program will and will not accept.
- You avoid the classic trap of reporting "missing/unsafe CSP" when the program only pays for execution.
Tools used: local static server, browser devtools, curl. No automated scanning.